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The book of  Liliana Albertazzi, Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano (Springer 2006) 
is a punctual and complete presentation of the thought of Franz Brentano (accompanied by a rich 
bibliography) concerning all the fundamental problems of his  work and  showing those to which 
Brentano’s fortune and importance in the second half of the  nineteenth century  and in the first half 
of  the  twentieth  century  are  due;  in  part,  they  are  still  fundamental  in  the  contemporary 
philosophical, psychological and physiopsychological research. It is not possible to present all the 
aspects of the Brentano’s complex way which Albertazzi learnedly brings out; therefore I shall 
highlight  the  aspect  in  my  opinion  more  interesting,  the  aspect  for  that  the  theory  of  the 
intentionality is a theory of perceiving.  
The book is focusing both on the problem of the perceived and of the modalities of the perception, 
and on theoretical  implications  of the perception act  from the point of view of the concept of 
reality:  by  the  appropriate  expression  «immanent  realism»,  the  title  introduces  to  the  mature 
attitude of Brentano. With reference to this, the book supports by documentary evidence the more 
meaningful changes of Brentano’s thought in the course of his life. Among the better highlighted 
problems, shows all his fecundity that of the nature of secondary qualities such as colours: the more 
important question is that «concepts like a colour or a sound in general are not immediately given 
by the sensory capacity, which only furnishes sensations of a particular red of a certain kind» (p. 
71). These concepts as the concepts of number and substance depend on intellect, the cognizing 
faculty  that  differs  from faculties  of  sensory cognition  (p.  72).  According  to  Brentano in  The 
Psychology of Aristotle, «we have in us the concept of colour and the concept of a tone in general, 
and  these  representations  cannot  possibly  be  counted  among  the  sensory  images  of  sight  and 
hearing. For sight does indeed cognize white and black and each particular colour, but colour as 
such it does not cognize» (p. 72). From this point of view, we are conducted to the relationship 
between the intellectual faculty and the sensible faculty, one of the foundamental problems as of 
the brentanian interpretation of the Aristotele’s philosophy (p. 73) as of the Brentano’s tought. The 
problems involved in this relationship are focused on the function of the phantasy. In his book on 
The Psychology of Aristotle (1867), Brentano reminds that the phantasia is selled in the sensitive 
soul, between sensation and intellect  (on the phantasia or imagination,  see the note 66, p. 67), 
therefore its function is conditioning all the knowledge, sensible and intellectual.  It is the more 
meaningful  the  more  Brentano  went  on  reflecting  upon  this  matter,  from  The  Psychology  of  
Aristotle until a text especially dense like  Psychology III, pointing out the part of the «sensory 
representation» (p. 75) and its importance for the intellect. It is therefore particularly considerable 
that  the  nous  poietikos is  identified  with  the  imagination  (p.  76).  As  Albertazzi  maintains, 
«Brentano’s analytical re-reading of De anima has therefore led him to identify in the problem of 
the relation between sensory knowledge and noetic knowledge, and in that of the imagination and 
the temporal structure of the presentation, the core of a logical reconciliation between  theory of  
perception and  theory of knowledge. And it has also enabled him to verify the hypothesis with 
which  he  began.  His  investigations  of  the  phantasma and  of  the  temporal  structure  of 
presentations, which are intimately bound up with each other, would henceforth constitute one of 
the essential components of his psychological theory» (p. 77).
Much  properly,  Albertazzi  emphasizes  the  problem  of  the  intermediate  –  that  I  mean  as  an 
intermediate degree, to avoid dualistic interpretations –, of the trans-audible and the trans-odorous, 
«in Theophrastus’ terminology […]. Between the sensation and the senses, the potency and the act, 
there exists in fact an intermediate phase which is a correlate of the sensation itself given by the 
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medium concerned, and which enables transmission of the form in the sense of the releasing of the 
quidditas (nature) embedded in it. In other words, we perceive the form and not directly the activity 
of the external stimulus, so that the object of the sensation is properly the ‘aspect-s’ given by the 
means and not the physical substrate of, for example, the physical colour, the physical sound, etc. 
In each occurrence of figure/ground segmentation, then, as a basic law of perceptual organization, 
we refer to very complex relations between a medium and a perceptual object (or form) that is 
carried by it » (p. 81). In according to this physiologically oriented interpretation of Aristotle, there 
is another specific level within the process of assimilation that is responsible « for the presenting of 
appearances in the perceptual fields » (p. 81), as exemplified by the case of the development of 
colour  perception,  from forms  of light  (like brightness,  lustre  and changeability)  to  colours  of 
objects. Brentano’s reading and interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima highlights the contemporary 
problem of the reductionism or otherwise of his analysis of the perceptive process. Aristotle seems 
to permit three opinions with regard to the nature of the assimilative process: a physiological, a 
symbolic  or  representational,  an interpretation  embryonically  phenomenological  centred  on the 
existence of «a medium, between the stimulus and perception, which enables its assimilation in 
terms of continuity, although it is not directly ‘affected’» (p. 82). According to Albertazzi, the last 
interpretation is like the Brentano’s interpretation, with particular regard to the teory of continua. 
This interpretation supports the idea of an emergent level on the physiological basis. From this 
point  of  view,  Aristotle’s  theory  covers  a  number  of  themes  which  link  directly  with  the 
nineteenth-century  psychophysics,  particularly  as  regards  the  distinction  between  stimulus  and 
perception  of  forms,  and  also  as  regards  the  differences  among  the  diverse  formats  of 
representation (sensation, correlate, perception, representation, memory, judgement, etc.). This is 
the theme that unifies such apparently disparate works as Brentano's early aristotelian writings and 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, but also the texts collected in works as Philosophical  
Investigations  on  Space,  Time  and the  Continuum and  The  Theory  of  Categories,  to  which 
Albertazzi rightly dedicates a great attention.
In general, intuitive and noetic knowledge meet in the inner sense, in his turn intermediate between 
body and consciousness.
The various functions of the inner sense (like the distinction and the perception of differences 
among the objects of several senses, like the perception of the identity of the objects of different 
senses,  like making self-consciousness possible)  permit  to definite  the inner  sense  as «active  
corporeal quality which acts as the medium for every other sensation» (p. 70). Thanks inner sense, 
peceived objects become conscious and it is the subject of the animate body: «the proper sensible 
is therefore an inner sense different from all the other senses, which are external. Specifically, it is 
a  particular  sense  directed  at  the  inner  movements  of  the  sensitive  part.  It  is  also  the  most 
important  of  all  the senses,  because,  as  Brentano further  specifies:  ‘It  must  be this  sense that 
perceives not only what we sense, but also the remaining sensitive operations, for example, sensual 
desire, and that gives us self-consciousness to the extent to which it belongs to the sensory part. 
Without question, therefore, it is pre-eminent among all senses’», (p. 69, always referring to the 
book on Aristotle’s psychology). 
From all  these  considerations  derive  in  my opinion  two questions  concerning  the  relationship 
between  the  intermediate  degree  of  perceiving  and  the  inner  sense  as  primary  form  of 
consciousness,  between  inner  sense  and  imagination,  which  are  passing  not  only  through  the 
Brentano’s thought, nevertheless it is surely a peculiar merit of the study of Albertazzi to highlight 
this theme in Brentano.
According  to  Albertazzi,  the  antireductionism  of  Brentano  in  his  Psychology represents  a 
development of Aristotle’s theory of perception, independent on psychophysics; but also it is  the 
result of Brentano’s reflection on herbartian (p. 94) and lotzean themes. It is a meaningful aspect of 
the  work  of  Liliana  Albertazzi  to  underlining   the  importance  of  the  Lotze’s  book  Medical  
Psychology  or  Physiology  of  the  Soul (1852)  for  the  psychology  of  Brentano.  In  fact,  Lotze 
defends the perception against reflection, the concrete particular against pale and vacant general 
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ideas; according to Lotze, «there are concrete universals of sense which arise from perception» (p. 
88): Lotze has attached a great importance to the problem of the qualitative from the article Seele 
und Seeleleben (1846). Elements of his theory are to be found in the Külpe school (Mayer, Orth, 
Ach),  in  the  Leipzig  school  (Cornelius,  Stern),  and  in  the  Graz  school  (Meinong,  Ehrenfels, 
Witasek, Höfler, Benussi) (p. 89).
All these problems are analysed by Albertazzi from the point of view of the unity of the intentional 
act and of the complexity implicated in the intentionality.
The analysis  of the psychic acts and of the phenomenal appearances that arise on the basis of 
physiological  products  has  conducted  Brentano  «to  discover  and  to  describe  the  existence  of 
further modifications of stimuli – rather than the physiological modifications already analysed by 
psychophysiology  –  due  to  the  specific  structure of  consciousness»  (p.  94).  But  above  all, 
Brentano  and  his  school  have  analyzed   «the  organization  of  the  elementary  sensations  into  
temporal and spatial phenomenal patterns imposed by the structure of the intentional reference of 
presentations» (pp. 94-5) (what prompted the research by the Graz school into the structure of 
inner time). This is the most relevant aspect of Albertazzi’s presentation of brentanian thought, 
«which laid the basis for the study of the perceptual laws organization» (p. 95) and which, as 
Albertazzi insistently points out, «had aristotelian origins» (p. 5), but also – I point out – herbartian 
and lotzean origins. All these questions have been rather well characterizing the antireductionism 
of Brentano as well  that  of a great  part  of the philosophical  culture  of the second half  of the 
nineteenth  century.
Albertazzi  reminds  that  the  sensitive  soul  has  three  vital  capacities:  sensation,  imagination 
(phantasia) and intellect. Focusing on that, Brentano discusses Aristotle’s conception of sensation 
in general and of the subject of sensation itself (pp. 67-8). Finally Brentano «identifies the object 
of the  proper sensible – which differs from the object of each of the individual senses – in the 
sensation itself » (p. 69). The object of the proper sensible is not an external object: the proper 
sensible is an inner, particular sense, directed at the inner movements of the sensitive parts. It is 
also the most important of all the senses (p. 69) because it makes self-consciousness possible and 
acts as the medium for every other sensation: «it is responsible for the fact that perceived objects 
are conscious» and «resides not in the soul but in the animate body, of which it is the subject» (p. 
70). 
It is also correct to insist on the connection between this aspect of the aristotelian thought and the 
importance of the perception and of the inner conscience concept in Brentano, but it is necessary to 
investigate on the influence on these aspects of Brentano's philosophy of Herbart,Lotze, Fechner, 
Bain, Hamilton, Mill. 
Certainly,  on  commenting  Aristotle’s  psychology,  Brentano  highlights  an  intermediate  zone 
between inner sense and intellect, coming from the problem of concept like a colour or a sound in 
general,  which  «are  not  immediately  given  by  the  sensory  capacity,  which  only  furnishes 
sensations of a  particular red of a certain kind» (p. 71). As Brentano observes, «active in our 
consciousness  are  two different  types  of  faculty  which,  though  different,  cooperate  with  each 
other» (p. 71). In according to Brentano, always in The Psychology of Aristotle, «we have in us the 
concept of colour and the concept of a tone in general and these representations cannot possibly be 
counted among the sensory images of sight and hearing» (p. 72). But we «cognize white and black 
and each particular colour, but colour as such it does not cognize» (p. 72). Nevertheless we have an 
idea  of  the  white  colour  in  general  and  of  the  colour,  more  in  general.  This  is  a  capacity  of 
consciousness, to that contribute inner sense and intellect, according to the Aristotle’s language. It 
is one of the main merits of the study of Albertazzi to showing how such questions, originating 
from a juvenile work, produce fecund interrogatives at the end of the life of Brentano, when he 
thinks his own main problems again. It is showed in Psychology III, where Brentano returns to the 
relationship between the sensible faculty and the intellectual faculty and their objects. The sense 
and the intellect have the same objects «but given in abstract and simpler manner» (p. 73).   
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The objects are given in different ways. From this point of view, the nous poietikos is not as much 
a form of thought as what makes thinking possible. It is an another mode of givenness. 
This is an aspect very interesting of the theory of intentionality that Albertazzi presents carefully 
and in an articulated way, not from the already much studied point of view of the structure of 
relations among subject, act, content, object, but from the point of view of the different modalities 
of givenness of the sensible qualities of the objects, a givenness that is not simple but implies the 
co-operation of all the faculties. Only on assuming this, it becomes possible to explain why we can 
perceive  not  only  a  particular  shade  of  red,  but  also  the  redness  and  why  we  have  the 
perception/concept of the colour in general. All this implies the connections which Aristotle has 
already  singled  out  between  nous  poietikos  and  imagination,  between  temporal  course  and 
givenness, between temporal course and production of consciousness.
Both imagination and temporality are determining for the «qualitative level of reality – emergent at 
the physical and also physiological level» (p. 80). So we are facing the problem «of the direction of 
the assimilative process. That there is a direction in the process of perceiving has been outlined by 
Aristotle himself. Still undecided, however, is the direction of the arrow: or in other words, does 
the assimilative process start from outside, in the sense of an affection of the soul by the stimuli, or 
does it operate in reverse, so that the sensitive activity starts from the inner formal articulations and 
moves towards exterior objects? Or both?» (p. 81).
The analysis on colour become generally paradigmatic of the complexity of the intentional act  and 
of  the  way in  which the  reality  is  represented.  Far  from all  form of  the  ‘myth  of  the  given’, 
Brentano’s  thought  is  since  1874  one  of  the  most  conscious  form  of  consideration  of  the 
complexity of the ‘given’.
According to Brentano, the objects of our senses, like colours, sounds, warmth and taste, have a 
phenomenal character. Hence, they are signs of something existent, but they only possess reality 
within  our  sensations:  «the  objects  of  inner  experience,  or  psychic  states,  like  presentations, 
judgements  or  emotional  states,  are  such  that  we  immediately  have  ‘clear  knowledge’  and 
‘complete certainty’ in their regard, which makes them indubitably real and present» (p. 98). The 
measurement of phenomena and the perception of differences among them, «involve  qualitative 
psychic factors» (p. 104); this is the reason why Brentano is not in accordance with the Weber-
Fechner law, based on the logarithmic relation between variation of the stimulus and variation of 
the sensation: in according to Brentano, what is constant is their ratio. From this point of view, 
Brentano is criticizing Fechner’s work. «If Fechner’s intent was to discover a fundamental law on 
the measurement of the intensity of psychic phenomena, according to Brentano the fundamental 
flaw  in  his  teory  was  that  it  treated  as  equal what  was  only  equally  perceivable»  (p.  104). 
Brentano’s main question is then: «given that both psychic and physical phenomena have  inner  
character, when we measure the intensity of phenomena, what is it that we are measuring: the act 
or  the  content?»  (p.  105).  The  intensities  of  colours,  of  sounds are  the  intensities  of  physical 
phenomena because colour is not seeing, sound is not hearing.  «For my part», so Brentano, «I 
admit that if, on the basis of Fechner’s method, a measurement could be found for the physical 
phenomenon,  it  could  also  be  found  for  the  psychic  phenomenon  in  which  the  physical 
phenomenon is presented. Yet, it seems to me necessary to add the new restriction that only one 
aspect  of  the  psychic  phenomenon  should  be  measured  according  to  its  intensity,  namely  its 
reference to its primary object, for we shall see that the psychic phenomenon has still other aspects 
and it is not exhausted by this one reference» (p. 106, quoted from Psychology from an Empirical  
Standpoint).
Correctly Albertazzi discerns in this problem the origin of the theory of intentionality and points out 
an another Aristotle’s concept which Brentano shares: that there is a direction in the process of 
perceiving   (De  anima 414b  18-19,  428a  19-24),  even  if  the  direction  of  the  arrow remains 
undecided: «does the assimilative process start from outside, in the sense of an affection of the soul 
by the stimuli, or does it operate in reverse, so that the sensitive activity starts from the inner formal 
articulations and moves towards exterior objects? Or both?» (p. 81).
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According to Albertazzi, this problem, which is the focus of the entire psychophysical debate, has in 
recent times been clearly posed only by Köhler, in  The Task of Gestalt Psychology (the Sander’s 
work,  Structures,  totality  of  experience and  gestalt,  1930,  is  quoted  too),  and  «successively 
challenged by Gestalt psychology with its view of a functional correspondence between the spatio-
temporal structure of events and their mode of behaviour in the field. A further development has 
been  given  to  it  by the  analyses  conducted  by the  exponents  of  the  Ganzheitpsychologie,  and 
nowadays a similar position is expressed by process theory» (p. 81).
Always beginning from Aristotle’s thought, it is suggested the presence of another specific level, 
within the process of assimilation, responsible for the presenting of appearances in the perceptual 
fields. From this point of view, Brentano places himself at the crossing point of phenomenology and 
Gestalttheory, where they are sharing problems which in their variegate history have given even 
different solutions.
The chief problem is – I think – that  «there are concrete universals  of sense which arise from 
perception» (p. 88). He who is perceiving must be able both to perceive the most concrete and 
particular colour variations and to have the concept of redness and of a colour in general. This is the 
problem of the continuum, both as regards the colours and as regards more in general the givenness 
of a thing. What are the laws of sensations as psychic phenomenon and those of representations, 
judgements,  affections,  feelings?  In  according  to  Brentano,  «presentations  present,  exhibit  the  
structure of what appears in the now; consequently they are not a representation of the external 
world.  In  other  words,  the  proper  concern  of  the  Brentanian  theory  of  appearances  is  not  the 
detection  of  a  stimulus  array  (the  contemporary  standard  concept  of  information)  and/or  the 
transformation  and  integration  of  multiple  primitive  components  in  the  sense  of  viewpoint 
invariants, to use modern terminology. The connection between the content of presentation and its 
triggers is not taken into account, and put in brackets are the stimuli, or what are nowaday called 
transphenomenal correlates of consciousness» (p. 106). Albertazzi strengthens this main result of 
her own interpretation saying that «the objects of the psychic phenomena have the  phenomenal  
existence of appearances» (p. 109), an important concept which connects Brentano with Husserl’s 
phenomenology.
With regard to the problem of the appearance of a singular thing, it is of importance to remember 
the question of the space and the Lotze’s theory of local signs: according to Brentano, «the problem 
is not spatiality of the sensible qualities but the fact that these are  sensed as localized» (p. 108); 
Brentano returned to the problem of the localization of psychic phenomena (which Lotze has raised 
in his Medical Psychology) in Researches in Sense Psychology (1907) and in a number of passages 
in  Sensible  and Noetic  Consciousness (1928)  and  in  his  dictations  posthumously  published  as 
Philosophical Lectures on Space, Time and the Continuum (p. 108).
Brentano  describes  psychic  phenomena  as  the  only  phenomena  of  which  perception  is  really 
possible. Among the many and well-know problems concerning the intentional reference,
that of the existence of the inner object of the act of presentation (one of the most controversial 
parts of Brentano’s theory),  gave rise to the great experimental work in the school of psychology 
influenced  by  his  descriptive  psychology,  especially  those  of  Graz  and  Würzburg,  two  of  the 
branches of Gestaltpsychology.
From the Brentano’s point of view, the acts of presentation, as psychic phenomena, have intentional 
existence, in that they are directed towards some sort of object or objectuality, but they also possess 
real, effective existence, and it is this that distinguishes them from physical phenomena which in 
consciousness are given merely as appearances.  In referring to the question of the inner sense, 
Brentano can specify that, consequently, acts of presentation like knowing, rejoicing and desiring 
have existence endowed with evidence in inner perception, while colours, sounds and emotions, for 
example, have only mediated existence. The same applies to judgemental acts and contents. This 
difference  is  very interesting,  because  points  out  a certain  autonomy of  the colours  and of  the 
qualities  in  general,  to  which  we will  come back,  above all  why this  puts  the  question of  the 
mediation of a quality.  It is the problem of the secondary object and of its specific modality of 
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consciousness. As Brentano says, «every psychic act is conscious; consciousness of it being given 
to its interior. Hence, every psychic act, however simple, has a dual object, primary and secondary. 
The extremely simple act with which we hear, for example, has the sound as its primary object, and 
itself,  i.  e.  the psychic  phenomenon in which the sound is  heard,  as its  secondary object.  It  is 
conscious of this latter object in threefold manner: it present it, recognizes it, and hears it […]. The 
intensity of the presentation of the secondary object is in any case equal to that of the presentation 
of the primary object, and the same applies to the intensities of the judgement and the concomitant 
sentiment, to the extent that a presentation lies at their basis» (p. 115, quoted from Psychology I).
The  problem of  the secondariness  is  the more  significative  the  more  in  its  sphere  colours  and 
sounds present a modality analogous to the modality of judgements and feelings; these acts have an 
unitary form in a unitary whole, because the psychic act is a whole endowed with non-separable 
parts. 
The  psychic  phenomenon  in  which  the  sound  is  heard,  as  secondary  object,  is  that  what  the 
consciousness implies, it is the premise of the act as a whole and of the temporal continuum. Unity 
of consciousness is not its simplicity and this unity is produced by the complex structure of the 
secondary  act,  where  temporal  succession  and  development  of  perceptive  continuum meet  and 
whose result  is  the  localization  in  the  space.  The  psychic  act  is  «a whole  endowed with  non-
separable parts» (p. 116) in a mereological theory of psychic phenomena. Multiplicity and variety 
on the one side, continuity and unity on the other in the secondary act and in the development of 
consciousness  are  the  questions  more  important  for  Brentano.  «The  interweaving  between  the 
temporal simultaneity that seemingly characterizes the unification of the  multiplicity of the parts 
and the unification of the multiformity of psychic phenomena (which are not, in fact, homogeneous 
parts), both given in actual presentation, and the spatial extendedness (Extensität) that characterizes 
individual visual, auditory or tactile presentations, was one of the reasons that prompted Brentano 
to develop a theory of perceptive continua, in particular the primary continua of time and space» (p. 
117).
The concept of act, «comprising both the idea of ‘psychic act’ and of ‘passive psychic affection’, 
performs a double role, psychological and metaphysical. The latter was spelled out in Brentano’s 
last writings, the former refers to the act of thinking when we consider its intentional character» (p. 
110). From Brentano’s analysis psychic phenomena are resulting as «succession of a continuous  
series of groups of simultaneous units in a sufficiently continuous variation» (p. 118), an expression 
full of interesting  problems, which Brentano has examined in  Psychology II and III and among 
which is particularly exemplifying the problem of the colours. It is very opportune to have devoted 
a great number of pages to the problem of the colours,  which are examples of intensive qualities, 
because the colour of the whole is not the sum of the colours of its parts, or a tactile stimulus 
noticed as it moves from one part of the body to another (p. 124). Seeing act and its content are 
different from colour and coloured objects; seeing act and its content have indeed an autonomous 
and specific existence. Red is at the same time the colour of an object, the quality of an appearing 
object, the content of my seeing act: as such it is my sensation of redness. Finally, more in general, 
still  undefined  was the  status  -  physiological  and/or  phenomenological  -  of  the  sensations  and 
therefore  their  eventual  cognitive  import:  questions  –  as  Albertazzi  specifies  -  still  unresolved 
today.
According to Brentano, «inner perception comprises, besides the act of presentation itself, not the 
object of the presentation as such but the object presented» (p. 113) and intensive magnitudes like 
colours «have a metathetic or positional order (qualitative, based on ‘different from’)» (p. 124); in 
general,   «we had three colour phenomena:  one pure red,  one pure blue and one of an intense 
medium violet; Hering shows rightly that the intensity of this redblue, considered as a whole, would 
not be different from the intensity given by those pure colours which are near it. But also in the 
redblue the two colours, red and blue,  subsist (we have proved this) in all truth included in its 
content. And about them it must be manifestly admitted that they here appear notably weaker than 
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they  do  where  they  are  pure.  (The  equality  of  quality  makes  the  comparison  of  intensities 
particularly easy and safe).  Therefore, the higher intensity of violet, equal to the intensity of pure  
red and pure blue, is composed here of trifling intensities of the two elements, red and blue (p. 123, 
quoted from On the Individuation of Sensory Appearances, 1896). The function of an ‘intermediate’ 
is relevant in the problem of the colour and of being coloured too; more generally, it is the problem 
of  unitariness  and  of  the  parts,  which  is  fundamental  in  Brentano,  in  Husserl  and  in  the 
Gestaltpsychologie. How we will see, Brentano connects the problem of the intermediate with that 
of continuum and devotes himself resolute to examine the laws of form organization with particular 
regard to the phenomena of auditory and visual presentation and to describe the facts and elements 
of psychic life and the laws that govern them from both a dynamic and a morphological point of 
view (pp. 120-1).
For  these reasons  I  have much appreciated  the fact  that  Albertazzi  has  at  length discussed the 
brentanian  idea  of  the  colour,  which  is  representative  of  the  brentanian  idea  of  intentionality, 
namely of  the  articulation  of  the  intentionality  in  the  representative  act  and in  the represented 
object, or content, or appearance. 
As correctly reminds Albertazzi, «at the time of Brentano, following the debate opened by Müller’s 
theory of specific energies, the psychophysical law had posed the problem of the qualitative status 
of our perceptual experience but, as we have seen, failed to resolve a number of essential questions» 
(p.  124), like that  of the perception of difference among perceptions  quantitative (between two 
surfaces) or qualitative (between two shades of red) and like that of the content of the perception of 
difference: the intensity of the sensations themselves (acts), the processes of apprehension, or their 
content, the correlate red. Naturally, intensity is related to extensity, in the sense that the intensity of 
a sensible quality is a function of extensive magnitudes,  a question which concerns all  sensory 
modalities.  
According to Brentano, «from our point of view, it is highly acceptable that to the composed sound 
must be due 1) an intensity of its own and 2) an intensity higher than the individual tones contained 
in it, that is an intensity even made up of their intensities. We find the very like in the sphere of the 
sense of sight» (p. 125, quoted from On the Individuation of Sensory Appearances).
Intensity has not parts but «the greater or lesser intensity of a colour on a surface is due to the 
greater or lesser density (empty space and filled space) of a given appearance, below the threshold 
of the noticeability of local differences. In other words, purple is a mixture of small, imperceptibly 
red and blue, particles. For this reason the presented intensity cannot be a magnitude and cannot be 
measured» (p. 126). Considering the relation between the whole and their parts with reference to 
perception, we are so led to the concepts of continuum and of  limit, which are the root of those of 
unity of the soul, of the consciousness and its phenomena. We must speak not about simple quality 
but about multiple qualities (multiple sounds, nuances appearing in different colours), because «the 
qualities presented are generally not simple but several in number and play the role of integral parts 
of  the  whole.  An example  is  given  by Brentano  in  his  analysis  of  the  ‘phenomenal  green’,  a 
perceived colour with ‘similarities’ to yellow and blue independently of their physical mixture; or 
by the fact that red and green, antagonistic colours (as remarked by Helmholtz), can be perceived 
together, at the same place, for example in ‘olive green’. The same hold in the auditory field for the 
pitch series, which can be analysed in terms of ‘Dumpf’ (dark) and ‘Hell’ (light)» (p. 137). We are 
facing with the following problems: the co-existence of  the impenetrability of qualities and their 
composed perceptual nature; the comparison of  the intensity of perceptions in different fields, «for 
example the difference between a loud sound and a faint odour» (p. 137). According to Albertazzi, 
«Brentano demonstrates the composite nature of the qualities in the appearance, the merging of the 
modes, and the presence of common components in all the perceptual fields, confirming once again 
Aristotle’s  doctrine  of  the  existence  of  an  intermodal  perception.  Furthermore,  the  idea  of  the 
existence  of  parts  of  appearances  and  the  possibility  that  they  have  similarities  in  different 
perceptual fields are strong arguments against the atomism of sensations or, more generally, against 
the sense data tradition of qualia» (p. 138). 
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This is maybe the most theoretical considerable point of the presentation by Albertazzi dedicated to 
Brentano’s thought, both for placing him in the history of philosophy, and for the emerging relation 
between  the  different  ambits  of  his  psychological  and  philosophical  research:  by  means  of 
connecting the concept of relation whole/parts and the concepts of continuum and of integration, 
Albertazzi is able to prove a deep unity in Brentano’s researches on perceptions of qualities, on the 
constitution of thing and consciousness, on their spatio-temporal determinations. In fact,  
«at  the  basis  of  Brentano’s  distinction  among  the  parts  of  the  soul  and  their  separability  and 
otherwise lay the concepts of perceptual space and plurality of spaces relative to the problem of the 
continua (spatial  and temporal),  which interested him until  the last years of his life. Brentano’s 
analysis  of mixed colours, which are not mixtures of the primary colours but are composed of 
juxtaposed phenomenal parts which are not noticed, and his analysis of noticing as such, led him to 
conclude that  the intensity of sensations  is nothing but a function of the  phenomenal space filled 
with a particular quality» (p. 141). On this ground, it is possible to specify the Brentano’s immanent 
realism because,  according  to  the analyses  of  Brentano’s  empirical  psychology,  regarding  both 
psychophysics and the descriptive theory of the soul, «perceiving figures is a cross-modal spatial  
process which comes about within a peri-personal, propriocentric space and in which vision is the 
dominant  modality»  (p.  141).  As  regards  the  colours,  they  are  marked  both  by  a  relative 
autonomous subsistence and by a tendency to limit.  According to Brentano, when one uses the 
expression  ‘intense’  with  colours,  he  indicates  «the  full  or  nearly  full  uniqueness  of  a  colour 
element. This is particularly clear with intense black, intense white, red, blue, yellow; if we speak of 
intense green as well, this could be explained by the fact that we are not aware of the combination 
of blue and yellow, which is yet straightforwardly denied by many, and also about orange and violet 
we were not perhaps so clearly aware as most are about grey, which was acknowledged as a mean 
and a blend between black and white. But maybe there is also no real internal consistency,  and 
orange, violet and green when saturated are called intense only because they are then accompanied 
by a lively feeling which distinguishes saturated colours from unsaturated ones. On the other hand, 
he who in brown discerns red and yellow will certainly say that each of the two elements, according 
to its preponderance, is more intense than the other one and neither is as intense as where it is 
present  as  a  pure  colour.  This  has  then  similarity  to  the  cases  where  several  tones  of  various 
strengths are joined into a chord, and thus it appears that, after all, the expression 'intensity' is used 
here in a very similar way as it is for tones. The only difference is that, whereas a weak tone can 
exist in itself, black is always associated with a weak colour as a supplement in a complementary 
measure» (p. 142, quoted from On the Doctrine of Intensity). 
More than to lead back Brentano’s thought to the doctrine of Aristotle, as Albertazzi does in the 
following  passage «the metaphysical outcomes of Brentano’s analysis of the soul […] led him to 
the  conclusion  that  the  sensible  quality  (accident)  (i.e.  the  Aristotelian  proper  sensible),  be  it 
auditory,  visual,  tactile  or whatever,  contains  place as its  ultimate subject (substance),  and that 
accidents attach to the single substance transmitted from one part to another. In this theory, still 
clearly Aristotelian, the soul in its potential aspects is viewed as a locus of immaterial forms which 
are altered by their perception» (p. 142), I think that it is important to emphasize how Brentano has 
been dealing with questions  shared with his  contemporaries,  as  in a  series  of  writings  like the 
Researches in Sense Psychology (1907) centred on the problem of multiple qualities in the various 
sensory fields. Brentano discussed the theses of Helmholtz, Hering, Mach and Lipps on the theory 
of colours, auditory perception and optical-geometric illusions; and he proposed the outline of a 
theory of perceptual space, of a theory of the temporal modes of intentional presentation, of a theory 
of continua and of the laws of their organization, which Brentano has studied for the rest of his life. 
According to Brentano, the sensory fields are perceptual continua which can be analysed «in terms 
of their part/whole structure – as already adumbrated in Descriptive Psychology with regard to acts 
of intentional reference» (p. 146), a point of view, which we will find in Husserl again. 
In discussing the problem of the optical-geometric illusions, with reference to the article  On the  
Doctrin of Sensation (1896), Albertazzi states precisely the discussion is important because it was 
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part of the debate between empiricists (Helmholtz, Zöllner) and nativists (Hering, Wundt) «which 
Brentano also joined by taking up a position in favour of the latter but with distinctive features of its 
own» (p. 147). Brentano’s innatism is distinguished by considering the sensation as qualitative, 
spatially determined, in spatial relationships, independent of processes of logical-inferential and/or 
unconscious elaboration (on the contrary Helmholtz or Zöllner), «further determined with respect to 
the correspondance between the organization of the stimuli and the perceptual system, which was 
instead  the  physical -physiological position  of  Hering,  or  the  purely  physiological  one  of 
Wundt» (p. 147). Also on the ground of his investigations into perceptual illusions, concerning in 
particular his theory of judgement and the modes of intentional presentation,  «which he revised 
during  the  years  at  the  turn of  the  century»  (p.  152),  Brentano  was convinced that  perception 
comprises different forms of completion, involving types of cognitive integration. 
This  concept  of  cognitive  integration  is  particularly  interesting  and  deserves  search  because 
expresses  the ability  of an intermediate  act.  This  integration  involves  the question whether  the 
forms  of  completion  responsible  for  perceptual  illusions  were  presentations  or  judgements  and 
involves the problem of the continuum, closely interconnected with the problem «of whether the 
apprehension of the temporal differences among the objects of presentation is given by differences 
within the object or within  its modes of presentation » (p. 156) (researches developed by Marty, 
Husserl, Meinong too) (pp. 156-7); but also the problem of the analogy and differences between 
integration and original association, with that Brentano was dealing in the years 1873-1894, while 
teaching at Würzburg and according to Stumpf. Starting from the observation «that the object of an 
inner perception remains in the consciousness for a certain amount of time even after the stimulus 
has ceased – as shown by the example of a melody», Brentano concludes that «it is not possible to 
speak of  only one mode of the past (or only one mode of the future). What instead occurs is a 
constant flow of  many modes  of  the past (or of the future)  in  succession».  But  these temporal 
moments are not given in actual perception: «they are instead elements added to the sensations by 
the  phantasia (the  original  association).  Only  what  is  intuitively  given is  present»  (pp.  158). 
Temporal differences therefore «are due not to acts of judging but to acts of  presenting with the 
intervention of the phantasia» (p. 159). In the years 1894-1904 Brentano continues to work on the 
aporias of the apprehension of temporal differences in the object of presentation, with some swings 
– as Albertazzi observes carefully – with regard the question if temporal differences are due to 
judgement, and in particular to the mode of judgement. The most important thing is that «every 
object has a temporal mode.  This is not a mode that continually changes but a temporal  point. 
Consequently,  only present objects can be real. In this third phase, in fact, Brentano considered 
every object that is real now, or that will be or has been real as occupying an objective temporal  
place which  is  either  prior  to,  contemporaneous  with,  or  subsequent  to  other  temporal  places. 
However, we present the temporal continuum to ourselves as a continuum of modes of recognizing 
the object directed both towards the real and the non real» (p. 160), by the co-operation of different 
acts  and  intermediate  functions  as  that  of  the  phantasia.  In  fact,  we daydream about  temporal 
objects and it seems that temporal differences reside in the presenting and they are prior to judging. 
Moreover,  we  desire  something  in  the  present  or  in  the  future,  and  neither  in  this  case  are 
judgements involved, only presentations and feelings and «is this last point of view that prevails in 
Psychology  II,  although fleeting  references  to  previous  conceptions  are  made  in  all  Brentano’s 
subsequent writings» (p. 160).
There is a variant which concerns also the primary objects of the presentation and the modes of 
presentations, namely the role performed by the whole of consciousness. Brentano now points out 
that the successive presentations of the present, past and future object are not individual acts but 
they are parts of a whole. «In the temporal extensity – that  is,  in the time of presentness – we 
apprehend  being before and  being after: in other words, we have a presentation of the temporal 
duration. Moreover, the temporal modes, previously considered to be modes of presenting together 
with the direct and indirect modes are now considered to be included in the indirect modes, so that 
the only direct mode is the present one. Brentano’s theory of time thus become a particular case of 
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the theory of the modes of presentation. Moreover, his theory of the modes of temporal presentation 
and the mereological theory of the parts of consciousness (set out in Descriptive Psychology) once 
again find a point of confluence and come to constitute the change of perspective which Brentano 
stresses at the beginning of  Psychology II and expounds in the  Appendices. According to the late 
phase,  then,  temporal  determinations  are  the  modes  by  which  substance  perceives  the  primary 
object of presentation, which is given in the indirect modes. Time is a determination of the object of 
our experience in so far as these are objects of inner perception. In a moment-now which is no 
longer  punctiform  and  includes  relations  like  ‘before’,  ‘simultaneous’,‘after’  and  ‘partial 
coincidence’, the impression of the instantaneity of the actual content of a presentation depends on 
the  fact  that  its  extension  coincides  with the unitariness  of  our  consciousness.  In  other  words, 
duration is the objective characteristics note of the contents of presentations which renders them 
uniform. In this way Brentano’s writings on time constitute the core of his immanent realism and 
act as a prelude to Husserl’s analysis of internal time» (p. 161). 
This long quotation stresses the most significant aspects of the Albertazzi’s interpretation, among 
whose consequences is the meaningful connection between the analyses of the temporal modes of 
intentional  reference  and  the  consistency  of  continua.  This  is  specially  important  because  the 
analysis of continua, «which was also partly set out in certain passages in Psychology III» affirms 
the primacy of the temporal  continuum over the spatial  continuum and affirms the coincidence 
between the concept of  a thing as substantially determined and that of ‘temporal’.
The  third  chapter  of  Psychology  III returns  to  the  problem of  the  knowledge  of  the  temporal 
absolute  and its  species  with  a  1915 essay whose  original  title  was  On the  Doctrine  of  Inner  
Perception, focused on the close connection between Brentano’s theory of intentional reference and 
his analysis of the temporal continuum.     
This is compelling to come back to the problem of perceptive continua, with particular regard to the 
perceptions of colour. In fact the very time rises and shows itself in the integration from which are 
appearing the perceptive continua in the more and more complex forms of the different acts. The 
possibility  of  the  continuous  transformation  of  one  colour  into  another,  of  the  continuous 
transformation of a colour into a sound, and of the transformation of the continuum itself are further 
problems.  Sensible  objects  belong  to  perceptive  continua  of  various  kinds  (spatial,  temporal, 
chromatic): an internal variation can come about in a particular perceptive content as a colour but 
cannot come about from red to sonorous, i.e. between different perceptive fields. «Sensible objects 
are extended, endowed with form and qualified, and sensible intuitions can be reduced to qualitative 
and local differences among phenomena, which is a conception already expressed by Brentano in 
Descriptive Psychology and reiterated in Psychology II. As to the differences in intensity of sensible 
objects  (for  example  a  darker  red,  a  weaker  sound,  but  also,  sometimes,  a  sound clearer  than 
another),  a matter  which Brentano had analysed since his investigations into the phychology of 
sense,  these  belonged  among  the  qualitative  properties»  (p.  194).  This  point,  in  according  to 
Albertazzi, again manifests his constant return to the thought of Aristotle; above all, here becomes 
meaning Brentano’s distinction between sensible/intuitive and noetic knowledge. All the objects are 
both invariant nucleus and elements of series of possible variations; they are individualized in the 
space  and  qualitative  determined,  but  at  the  same  time  they  are  still  determinable  in  other 
perspectives, in consequence of a permanent relation between intuitive individualizing knowledge 
and noetic generalizing knowledge. According to Brentano therefore, «we cannot speak of a special 
sense of space; every external intuition contains spatial elements given with concrete qualitative 
determinations, and I can isolate the former by disregarding these determinations only by means of 
an act  of noetic thought. If someone speaks of a sense of balance,  however,  then he isolates a 
special group of intuitions not on the basis of a characteristic that belongs to them as such, but 
because they provide a special point of reference for judging certain relations» (p. 194, quoted from 
Sensory and Noetic Consciousness (1928)). At the same time, two senses of the concept of the 
continuum are so outlined, that of continuum grounded on the analogy, and that sense according to 
which the continuum arises from the progressive, infinite diminishing of the parts. In the first sense, 
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in the same quoted text, Brentano says the sensible objects «though sensorially qualified, they are 
nevertheless qualified differently for each sense […]. We see, therefore, that if we use homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of qualities as a principle of classification and as a criterion to determine whether 
objects of sensory intuition belong to the same or to a different class, we need a further criterion in 
order to determine homogeneity.  It was pointed out that  a continuum might possibly serve this 
purpose; it is possible to proceed continuously from note to note and from colour to colour, but not 
from note to colour.
[…]. Aristotle pointed out that there are two extremes in every one of the qualitative categories, e. 
g. black and white in colours, an extreme high and an extreme low tone in sound. Indeed, it appears 
that there is not only an analogy to light and dark colours in high and low tones, but that a similar 
analogy to light and dark is found in all sensory areas. If we compare the impressions of cold and 
warmth and if we ask which of the two would be called light and which dark, the unanimous answer 
would be that the cold appears relatively light and the warm appears dark. The same is true of sweet 
and bitter,  the sweet being called light while the bitter  appears relatively dark.  It seems that in 
connection with colours, sounds and temperatures, we are dealing with lightness and darkness not 
in the same but only in analogous sense and thus we could say that we are dealing with different 
sensory areas when lightness and darkness appear not in the same but in an analogous sense. Hence, 
the question whether the sensation of temperature and other tactile sensations are homogeneous or 
heterogeneous  relates  to  the  question  whether  lightness  and  darkness  subsist  in  them  in  the 
equivalent or analogous sense » (p. 195, quoted from the same text).
In these dictations, as in Descriptive Psychology and in Researches in Sense Psychology, Brentano 
highlights the question of the intermodal aspects of the qualities: are qualities homogeneous even 
between different phenomenal fields? Why can we say that a red is ‘hot’ and a blue is ‘cold’, or that 
there is a ‘black sound’ or a ‘white sound’? The homogeneity or heterogeneity of the sensations of 
the various sensory domains involves the question of the analogous existence, in these fields, of two 
qualitative  extremes of lightness  and darkness corresponding to  hot  and cold,  sweet  and bitter, 
according to the type of sensory intuition. From this point of view, Brentano can object to Lotze’s 
theory  of  the  intensive  qualities  by  observing  that  intensity  does  not  have  parts  and  that  the 
phenomena «have a  density which is due to the gradual  dwindling away of a series of extensive  
parts. This happens, for example, when a surface changes colour from red to blue passing through 
violet: in this case, parts of red and parts of blue coexist, although they are imperceptibly small 
qualitative solids and blanks» (p. 196). Sensible aspects of the phenomena are its different parts and 
they  are  present  even  separately  from  each  other  in  the  sensory  fields.  Brentano  notes:  «all 
differences among sensory intuitions are derived, ultimately, from qualitative and local differences. 
As to the qualitative aspects, which are heterogeneous in every sensory area, and which are not 
synonymous with each other, but merely analogous. In one and the same sensory area they are 
homogeneous, thus it can happen that two phenomena, even though they have specific qualitative 
differences, appear equally light. Doesn’t that force us to distinguish between two other absolute 
components i. e. lightness and quality? Some might still be inclined to assume that in certain cases 
there exists only one darkness or lightness that corresponds to the respective sensory area, while in 
other cases,  the above mentioned qualification is added. Thus a person might  maintain that,  as 
regards the sense of sight, black, white and the grey in –between are nothing but differences in 
lightness, while the so-called saturated colours reveal qualitative differences as well. Thus a red or a 
green could be of the same degree of lightness as a certain grey, but to the degree of lightness would 
be added another quality which the colour grey does not have. This would be a mistake in my 
opinion. Pure red has a certain lightness that belongs to this qualitative species, and this lightness 
would be the same as that of a particular shade of grey. But wouldn’t that mean that the red is part 
of the grey in that it shares its lightness, since the grey consists of nothing but in this lightness? One 
would have to say that the grey is mixed in with it, i.e. imperceivable small particles of grey which 
constitute its whole lightness, alternate with other particles, that are red and which do not partake of 
lightness or darkness. As to lightness, it would be the same as the grey, but less intensive, since the 
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lightness would be less dense in it. If I mix grey with pure red, then according to this theory the 
infusion  of  lightness  would  merely  intensify  that  already  given.  But  this  does  not  seem  to 
correspond to all the actual phenomena. In such a case we cannot speak of a greater intensity of 
lightness, but only of the occurrence of a deviation in quality, whereby the lightness remains the 
same» (p. 197, quoted from Sensory and Noetic Consciousness).
Brentano  concludes  his  phenomenological  observations  defending  the  point  of  view  that  the 
lightness and darkness of the objects of sensory intuitions depend on the extent of their distance 
from black; lightness and qualification cannot therefore be separated out as two different qualities. 
Still  Hering shared an analogy theory,  experimentally tested by Meinong,  Benussi,  Musatti,  all 
explaining  «the  intensity,  saturation  and  brightness  of  sensations  on  the  basis  of  the  relation 
between  continuous  chromatic  variety  (colours)  and  continuous  achromatic  variety  (greys)»  (p. 
198). The very important conclusion is that «the differences among sensory intuitions are all due to 
qualitative and local differences, and that the local quality is homogeneous for all the sensory fields 
and for all sensory intuitions» (pp. 198); this is the basis of a theory of knowledge which implies a 
continuistic integration.    
According to Brentano, only the things given in evident manner by inner perception are existing 
and  they  are   intentional  presentations,  that  is  «concrete  spatio-temporal  structures of  psychic 
energy»  (p.  233);  Albertazzi  defines  them  as  «pointers towards  phenomenal  appearances  like 
colour, sounds, odours and tactile perceptions (the ‘physical phenomena’), and secondly towards 
higher-order psychic objectuality of other kinds. From the point of view of actual presentation in 
the moment-now (Jezt), we immediately perceive not ‘objects’ – which in Brentano’s late theory 
became synsemantic entities – but ‘aspects’ (characteristic notes) or at least ‘strings of events’ (like 
rotating discs). The ground of these phenomena is proximal space – that is, the visual, auditory, 
tactile,  graspable  sensible,  phenomenal  space (Sinnesraum)  of  our  everyday  experience.  We 
characterise phenomenal space through our sight (shape, size position and movement), touch and 
kinesthesia  (shape,  size and distance),  hearing  (direction  of  sounds)  and olfaction  (direction  of 
odours). The intensity of sense qualities is a function of the extensive parts of the phenomenal 
space» (pp. 233-34).
On the ground of this comprehensive presentation of the concept of phenomenon, Albertazzi is able 
to explain why Brentano has been a reference for a significant part of the thought of the nineteenth 
and of the twenty century, with particular regard to the concept of the phenomenon as continuum, in 
the ambit of a sort of empirical geometry of inner perception, in which the fundamental concept of 
direction of  the intentional presentation «receives further specification as the constitutive element  
of perceptive forms (p. 234). According to Albertazzi, also «Brentano’s conception of continua was 
part of a neo-Aristotelian theory of physics put forward in various forms by authors of the period, 
mainly of German culture» (pp. 234-5), but I think it is still more interesting to show its similarities 
and divergences  «with the theories  of Herbart,  Überweg, Lipps, Mach, Helmholtz,  Blumenfeld, 
Hillebrand, above all because Brentano’s theory «gave rise to phenomenological and/or gestaltist 
analyses by Husserl, Bühler, Selz, von Allesch and, later, by Musatti. All these authors, in fact, 
evidenced the grounding of continua in the world of perception»(p. 235).
Albertazzi herself points out that, besides their aristotelian origin, Brentano’s theories on continua 
were influenced by Überweg and his empirical conception of perceptual space. Überweg elaborates 
the notions of the «space as a homogeneous continuum of places able to divide itself and to extend 
itself indefinitely from any whatever part that a body may occupy, and in any whatever direction 
that it may move» (p. 237); of the points as indefinitely small spaces.
According to Überweg, the concept of homogeneity concerns the appearance of perceptive space 
and «the constant transformation of objects in the visual field according to how they appear from 
different  perspectives»  (p.  237):  the  perceptual  space  is  homogeneous,  continuous,  unbounded. 
«Empirical  and descriptive analysis  only recognises ‘the indefinitely small  space’ – that  is,  the 
progression of the division. A crucial feature of the theory is, then, that a geometrical point is only 
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an idealised location. Moreover, perceptual points have an  intrinsic structure. From a  perceptual  
point of view, in fact, a ‘point’ is a location with different possible directions: points may have parts 
and coincide with parts, exactly as parts may coincide among themselves […] . Thus the concept of 
boundary,  which as the  outermost element  identifies  a perceptual form,  is the  fundamental fact 
about phenomenal space. The points and lines that delimit a surface are examples of the bounding 
of perceptual  space. Moreover,  boundaries are never given in isolation:  they are always part of 
larger spatial forms, as Brentano too would later maintain. Boundaries have an inner and an outer 
side,  as  evidenced,  for  example,  by  the  phenomena  relative  to  figure/ground  organisation  in 
perception»  (pp.  238-9).  It  is  very  interesting  to  connect  Überweg  and  Brentano,  as  well  as 
Brentano and all  the discussions of continua  (also mathematical  ones) conducted at  the end of 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. «More generally, at issue were the nature and 
the laws of psychophysics that provided the basis for the notion of continuum. This was one of the 
questions at the centre of Brentano’s inquiries, and it is a question still unresolved in contemporary 
science» (p. 239). 
Against the mathematical theories of continua Brentano contests the reduction of the extendedness 
of perceptual phenomena to quantitative metric extension. On the contrary, it is necessary to study 
the specific nature of perceptual space-time, and to resolve the problem of measuring perceptual 
phenomena (what do we measure, asks Albertazzi again, the act, the object or the content?), and 
finally the problem of how to model phenomena correctly.  An  empirical theory of continua for 
Brentano is a descriptive theory of phenomenal continua as they appear in the various perceptual 
fields. From an another point of view, Brentano offers a metaphisical theory based on «the bearer 
of  the  intentional  reference,  the  ‘thinker’  as  the  ultimate  metaphysical  entity  of  Brentano’s 
metaphysics» (p. 240), in the ambit of an ontologically grounded epistemology.
As Albertazzi  reminds,   the main texts  for Brentano’s analyses  of perceptive  continua are  The 
Theory  of  Categories,  published  posthumously  by  A.  Kastil  in  1933,  and  Philosophical  
Investigations on Space,  Time and the Continuum published posthumously in 1976, with added 
notes by Kastil and edited by S. Körner and R. M. Chisholm (p. 240).
According to Brentano, «what is continuous must be given to us as an individual intuition and must 
therefore be abstracted there from» (p. 241, quoted from  Philosophical Investigations on Space,  
Time and the Continuum).
On the basis of the results of his investigations into the nature and number of the properties of 
phenomena, from Descriptive Psychology to the Appendices of Psychology II and to Psychology III, 
Brentano,  who  -  according  to  Albertazzi  -  «develops  a  qualitative Aristotelian  theory  of 
phenomenal  continua  and  of  place  due  to  a  contact  between  parts»  (p.  242),  considers  the 
continuum as an intuitive concept. Locality, quality and lightness are the fundamental characteristic 
notes of the objects of visible space: «its parts (of the homogeneous mass), like the part of a blue 
surface, are all the same in quality, but differ from each other spatially. In respect of place, there are 
infinitesimal differences; every specific difference (i. e. very absolute spatial kind) exists only as a 
punctiform boundary, and its nature is determined in part by that which is bounded. This is why the 
spatial nature of a point differs according to whether it serves as a boundary in all or only in some 
directions. Thus, a point located inside a physical thing serves as a boundary in all directions, but a 
point on a surface or an edge or a vertex serves as a boundary only in some directions. And the 
point in a vertex will differ in accordance with the directions of the edges that meet at the vertex. 
Thus coinciding points may be said to differ with respect to their spatial nature, with the result that 
it will not be absurd to say that one of them is blue and the other red» (p. 243, quoted from The 
Theory of Categories).
Brentano can also affirm that «the concept of the continuous is acquired not through combinations 
of characteristic notes taken from different intuitions and experiences, but through abstraction from 
unitary  intuitions»  (p.  244,  quoted  from  Philosophical  Investigations  on  Time,  Space  and  the  
Continuum, pp. 6-79). In spite of the fragmentary form of the texts constituting the Philosophical  
Lectures on Space, Time and the Continuum and those of The Theory of Categories, the position of 
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Brentano is evidently very interesting from two points of view, that of the relation between intuition 
and abstraction, and that of the identification of the sensation both with quality, lightness/darkness, 
saturation and with place and individuation based on the impenetrability of qualities. This means 
that intensity of a sensation derives from its extensity and is «reductible to the opposition between 
full and empty, and between light and dark» (p. 245). As will be in Husserl, the concept of fullness 
has a great importance in Brentano, because «every place in the space of the senses can be filled by 
one single qualitative instance (i.e. by sound, colour, or quality of contactile sense), so that the 
intensity of sensations therefore depends on the greater or lesser fullness of the phenomenal space, 
given  that  this  space  is  proportional  to  the  density  of  the  places  filled  by  the  sensations 
themselves» (p. 245). If the intensity of a phenomenon varies, therefore, «what we perceive is not 
the same phenomenon with different degrees of completeness, but rather  different things with the 
same degree of completeness. Thus, a sound heard as a continuous variation of intensity, or a colour 
seen as progressively fading away, are not the same sound or the same colour. They are instead 
different entities given in different ways in relation to their different locations in phenomenal space 
(in this case of sound or colour)» (p. 245). Continua therefore are all multiple and ripropose all the 
questions concerning the relations between the parts and the whole and the concept of boundary, 
also on the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary continua; «primary continua are 
uniform (homogeneous)  and  endowed  with  constant  direction and  velocity.  In  particular,  the 
primary continua consist of all differences of place, time and space.
Superimposed on the primary continua are the  secondary  ones, which are  co-extensive with the 
former but heterogeneous, marked by different kinds of boundaries, and with different degrees of 
direction and velocity. Moreover, time is a primary continuum with respect to space and space is 
primary  with  respect  to  the  secondary  continua.  As  we have  seen,  according  to  Brentano and 
following Überweg,  space as a whole is the  homogeneous series of positions filled by qualitative 
instances which can be constructed according to structural laws, that is, according to the system of 
places» (p.  246).  It  is  fundamental  for the perception-based theory of continua of  Brentano to 
distinguish between primary continua and secondary continua: the primary continua are uniform 
and possess constant velocity and direction; the secondary continua manifest change of direction, 
with different degree, intensity and velocity.  The main problem is how establish the boundaries, 
which, according to Brentano, never exist in isolation. «In perceptive reality there are no points, 
lines or surfaces as entities in themselves,  isolated from the field and from the surround in which 
they are manifest. We may draw on Überweg’s theory to exemplify the layering and embeddedness 
of  continua  thus:  a  ‘point’  is  the inner  boundary of  a  ‘line’,  a  line is  the  inner  boundary of a 
‘surface’ and a surface is the inner boundary of a ‘solid’ (which is also Poincaré’s argument)» (p. 
249). In Brentano words: «We can distinguish continua which exist only as boundary of some other 
continuous» (p. 249, quoted from Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum). 
Boundaries are non-independent parts or moments of the continuum; boundaries and coincidence of 
boundaries may in principle be indefinite, as demonstrated by the phenomena of perceptual fusion 
(Verschmelzung)  of  the  different  aspects.  As  Albertazzi  recalls,  the  intensive  qualities  are 
reconducted to the extensive ones, as in  Descriptive Psychology or in a paper that Brentano has 
given  in  1869  to  the  Congress  of  Munich  on  Individuation,  Multiple  Quality  and Intensity  of  
Sensible Phenomena. For an example, in a red and blue chessboard, if the spatial extension of the 
red and blue squares is progressively reduced, we obtain the perception of violet, but «there is an 
intermediate moment in which the chessboard is perceived as  something simultaneously red and 
blue (think, for example, of a Seurat painting) but not in the same positions. This means that what 
happens is a superimposition of perceived attributes. This ‘rendering’ comes about for mainly two 
reasons: the first is an assimilative phenomenon which occurs when the coloured areas are small but 
still distinguishable; the second concerns the blue, since the margin that it forms with other colours 
(generally with all colours, but especially with colours of the same brightness) is not stable but 
tends to 'shift', as in Helmholtz’s ‘fluttering heart’ illusion. It is these two phenomena that produce 
the  impression  of  movement.  What  is  continuous  here  assumes  the  character  of  ‘reddish’  and 
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‘bluish’ and again displays the feature of a coincidence of boundaries. These boundaries are both 
red and blue, but neither colour is in full ‘plerosis’ (direction)» (pp. 253-4). This is a phenomenon 
of density in the sensory field, a phenomenon of emptiness and of fillness, a kind of weakening or 
diminishing of the phenomenon (p. 254). Among the consequences of the thesis of the extensity of 
phenomenal  space and of the principle  of the impenetrability of qualities  there is to negate the 
existence of intermediate colours and to affirm instead the existence of mixed ones. «Colours other 
than the fundamental  ones are therefore considered to be mixtures  of the latter:  hence,  orange, 
violet, and so on, are perceived as such because the fundamental colours are present within then in 
spatial phenomenal particles below the threshold of perception. This is therefore a further case of 
extensive magnitudes and in particular of  a gradual disappearance of extensive parts, although it 
should be borne in mind that these are parts of the  sensible field,  not parts of the space of the 
physical  world.  In  short,  once  again,  this  is  a  matter  of  the  greater  or  lesser  density  of  the 
phenomenal manifestation in the intentional presentation» (p. 255). Unlike in other cases,  in this 
regard it can be useful to quote some words of Kastil, who, while commenting on a dictation in The 
Theory of Categories, observes: «thus if two colours, red and blue, are alternated with each other in 
the noticeable parts of sensible space, then the whole is perceived as violet, hence as reddish blue, 
and within this whole both red and blue or pure red. If one of the two colours were removed from 
the visual field and replaced with empty (but not black) places, the resulting quality would have 
what is called diminished intensity. If both the filled and empty portions of the field were large 
enough to be noticed, we would perceive a clear juxtaposition of filled and unfilled places;  we 
would not be misled into assuming that we are dealing here with any so-called intensive magnitude, 
or a magnitude that has no parts. Only because the individual parts are imperceptible and because 
all parts together produce the total impression of a less intense colour, do we have the illusion of a 
special kind of magnitude without parts, that must be distinguished from extensive magnitude. And 
so in fact, the so-called degrees of intensity pertain to extensive magnitudes which are divisible into 
parts. They pertain in other words to the greater or lesser density of a given appearance (below the 
threshold of noticeability of local differences)» (p. 255). There are many important consequences: 
the points, as the smallest parts of spaces, may themselves have parts; the direction influences the 
degree  of  grouping into  perceptual  units.  Very interesting  examples  of  the role  of  direction  in 
perception  are  phenomena  of  amodal  completion  (as  Helmholtz  himself  remarked),  where  the 
direction of the contour of the occluded figure changes, or phenomena of texture segregation and of 
figure/ground organisation. Moreover, «the perceptive points may also coincide with parts, exactly 
as the parts may coincide with each other. In the case of a red disc, for example, the median point of 
the  disc  is  also  the  point  of  origin of  the  various  individual  radii.  Consequently,  Brentano 
concludes, every point of a two- or three- dimensional continuum is an infinite (and compressed) 
collection of distinct  points.  It  is for this reason that a geometrical  or mathematical  point is an 
idealized place. For the points have an intrinsic structure: indeed, from a perceptive point of view, a 
point is a place with different possible directions» (p. 261). There are still noticeable consequences, 
as such that boundaries may be external and internal and that internal and external borders are of 
crucial importance in the formation of perceptive patterns: the boundaries of the primary continua 
(space and time) are all internal while «external boundaries are only identifiable in the qualitative  
filling of spatio-temporal structures according to the nature of internal presentation. In other words, 
discontinuity always arises and appears from an underlying spatio-temporal continuity. Examples 
are a region of space coloured in two different ways, or an object which starts from a state of rest to 
move from right to left» (p. 261). On one side, Brentano continues a refined analysis of types of 
continua (like multiform continua); multiform boundary is therefore «the boundary of a continuum 
which is unitary (not multiple) but variously differentiated: that is, constituted by non-independent  
parts or moments: for example, a seeing a region of space, a hearing, a thinking something in the 
actual moment» (p. 262).
The problem of the continua binds itself with the problem of the consciousness and with that of its 
unity, because the continua are the intentional objects of the consciousness. Every thing that intuits 
15
a continuum is itself a continuous multiplicity (Vielfaches) and not a plurality (Vielem). Example of 
a multiform continuum is that two places which are not consecutive and are independent of each 
other may be perceived together; example of a multiple temporal continuum is a series of sounds in 
sequence, while an example of a multiform temporal continuum is a melody: all they are acts of 
intentional presentations and self psychic acts or intentional presentations – the foundations of the 
descriptive psychology – can be defined as multiform continua,  topical  continua (existing in all 
their  parts),  continua  composed  of  homogeneous  and  connected  parts.  There  is  a  connection 
between inner perception and continua:  «the  inner  perception of  an object takes the form of a 
multiform  and  temporally  continuous  continuum because  of  the  temporal  modes  in  which  the 
spatial  qualities  manifest  themselves in  accordance  with  the  process  of  original  association 
(proteraesthesis). Indeed, inner perception is the locus of original intuition of continua (relatively to 
spatial and temporal objects) which unfold as  perceptions of themselves qua multiform continua. 
Brentano’s reflection on continua therefore form the basis of a metaphysical  theory founded on 
proprioception» (p. 263).
Gestaltpsychology and  the  experimental  phenomenology  have  confirmed  some  aspects  of 
Brentano’s theory of continua of which main merit is to highlight the complexity of phenomena-in-
act  in  perception;  it  is  deriving  «from  the  superimposition  of  diverse  continua,  multiple  and 
multiform, concomitant with each other, in actual presentness, thereby confirming some of the key 
hypotheses of Brentano’s descriptive psychology. Moreover, his theory is the first step towards a 
geometry  of  cognitive  (perceptual)  space»  (p.  266)  and  has  been  developed  by  Meinong  and 
Husserl.
They have studied the genesis of continua, considering their extensity as the product of a continuous 
series of increments in any whatever phenomenal property, even temporal, of continua themselves: 
«every incremental series becomes a total continuum, so that  every actual extension is a part (or 
section) of the incremental series of phenomena in a particular perceptive field (for example, the 
series of the pitches of sounds versus the series of their intensities).
Characteristic of all incremental phenomena, moreover, is the  transposition of forms and the fact 
they can be related to the  opposition and continuous transition between light and dark in all the  
sensible fields. The problem of the homogeneity and the heterogeneity of sensations thus reduces to 
their lightness or darkness in analogous sense – an outcome of the Researches in the Psychology of  
Sense – so that the lightness of tastes, for example, corresponds to the lightness of temperatures, etc. 
Experimental analyses based on these theories have been conducted mainly by Benussi, Selz and 
Bühler, who thus laid the bases of intermodal perception analysis» (p. 267). 
A theory of continua requires on one hand a process of integration of their manifold aspects, on 
other  hand  the  determination  of  the  boundaries  of  the  continua  and  their  individuation.  After 
highlighting  the  continuity  of  every  perception  and  of  the  whole  perceptive  field,  it  becomes 
necessary to border and to delineate every single thing or event and the same time to delineate the 
“Erlebnisse” of the consciousness, that is the stream of the life of the consciousness. 
«For Brentano, the principle of individuation of an entity – as it intentionally exists – consists in 
what distinguishes it in content from other things that fall under the same concept in which it can be 
thought. For example, what marks off  the red from  the coloured cannot be thought: it is in this 
difference, therefore, as regards quality, that the individuality or haecceity of the entity in question 
consists. In other words, the concept of  red thing contains within itself the concept of  coloured 
thing. I may subsequently specify a coloured thing as a red thing, a coloured thing as a two-foot-
long thing, then consider a  two-foot long thing that is coloured and flavoured, and also  red and 
sweet, and so on, thus obtaining a series of specifications which range from a species specialissima 
to a summus genus which cannot be generalized further. By rejecting Aristotle’s claim that one and 
the same individual cannot be defined by means of diverse proximal differences of the genus under 
which it falls, therefore, Brentano affirms that the concept of  ens reale – or  thing – is the only 
summus genus» (pp. 274-5).
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A large number of questions are concentrate,  from that of logical  differentiation of general  and 
particular  at  the different  levels  of the reality  to  that  of the constitution  by localization,  which 
Albertazzi  defines as metaphisical  in this sense: «Brentano’s theory of substance,  his theory of 
continua,  and  his  theory  of  intentional  reference  are  different  facets  of  the  same  metaphysical 
problem, given that red thing, red and coloured thing, and so on, contain a spatial determination, a 
qualitative  localization  and  a  temporal  determination.  They  are  therefore  elements  of  the 
presentational continuum already analysed in Descriptive Psychology» (p. 275).
But the main problem is the determination of individual realities as limits of continuous processes 
and the answer to the question about the meanings of “real”. This is a general theme of Brentano’s 
thought  during  all  his  life,  from  discussing  the  different  meanings  of  the  being  according  to 
Aristotle to Psychology III and to all the Nachlass; a theme strictly connected with the question of 
the  continuum.  The  individualization  is  always  involving  localization;  therefore  Brentano  can 
affirm that there are not intuitive absolute places/determinations.
We are perceiving by intuition relative places which are involving absolute places only in general – 
on the analogy of the intuition of the greater and the smaller, that is of the relatively great which 
only is accessible to us and which involves the intuition of the great in general. The representation 
of relative places is not depending on an usual comparison but is an original relational representing 
involved in sensing. Something analogous happens with regard to time intuition, since also in it is 
understood something relative, which is a relational representation (from a footnote of O. Kraus at § 
20 of  Psichology III). It seems to me is here clear the peculiar connection which is by Brentano 
defined, even if always problematically, between intuitive and noetic knowledge - the capacity of 
seeing the general. In fact noetic thought is analysing and making know absolute local relations 
presupposed by sensible local relations (§§ 11-13 of the Fenomenognosis of the sensible and noetic  
consciousness in  Psychology III).  On  the  one  side  all  sensible  intuitions  are  individual  and 
differentiated because of localisation, on the other side the concept allows to derive the presupposed 
general relation (§ 15). According to Brentano, there are degrees of generality (§ 6, chap. 2,  II part 
of  Psychology  III);  therefore,  general  concepts  of  thing,  of  colour,  which  are  continuous,  are 
preceding the particular-individual concepts, which are their limits. From a methodological point of 
view, this couple of concepts (continuum/limit) explains both the formation of all other concepts 
and the relations between intuition and concept: every of these is a limit of a continuum. In this way 
it is possible to resolve the problem of the existence of the concept of a pure black, never given in 
the sensible intuition: it is derivable from an analysing, seeing the difference, comparing process. In 
the concepts  of red,  blue,  point,  right  line also there are complex  processes.  Therefore the red 
concept is not only intuitive but also ideal. Our intuitions – both the inner and the external - have a 
certain  indeterminateness  and  generality,  because  they  are  free  from  all  specific  temporal 
individualization  (§12).  According  to  Brentano,  to  perceiving  is  complex  in  analogy  with  to 
representing – the more important act of intentional attitude -  because of the necessary interaction 
of external senses and inner sense. It is a great merit of the book of Albertazzi to have showed how 
are interacting in to perceiving-representing external and inner moments of to perceiving, so that 
from the boundary/limit of external/inner perception is aroused the inner sense as primary form of 
consciousness. 
Further investigations in Brentano’s thought must still precisely analyse in which manner intuitive 
and noetic processes can both interact and differentiate in order to realize all the possible and most 
distinguished perceptive shades in the various perceptive fields.  From this point of view it will be 
very interesting  to  compare  Brentano and Husserl,  above all  with regard to  problematic  of the 
passive  syntheses,  by Husserl  developed  in  the  twenty  and  thirty  years,  in  the  manuscripts  of 
Esperience and Judgement and of the  Crisis  of  the European Sciences.  Nevertheless,  there  are 
remarkable  differences  between  Brentano  and  Husserl,  who  has  defended  unlike  Brentano  the 
trascendental  conception  of  the  correlative  processes.  Neo-aristotelism,  herbartian  and  lotzean 
tradition meet in Brentano both with the influence of English philosophy (Mill, Bain), and with a 
kind of neo-leibnizianism. The philosophy of the small perceptions, of the shades in the genesis of 
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the consciousness and above all of the continuum offers concepts still useful in order to explain the 
questions of the inner sense and of the intermediate degrees of the consciousness between intuition 
and noetic knowledge. Brentano can therefore say that there are not individual intuition, showing 
from an antiriductionist  point of view how nothing is more complex than the givenness and its 
perception-representation.  Represented  objects  are  then  always  limits  of  a  continuum, 
individuations in a horizon of generality,  in a process which is  not  a simple to abstract  but a 
complicated to distinguish and to compare. The outcomes are not only concepts of intuitive unity 
but involved thoughts, which relate many things thought in recto and in obliquo. All the things, all 
subjects  are  in  general  the  limits  of  a  spatio-temporal  continuum  (§§  6-7  chap.  II,  part  II  of 
Psychology III). Ourselves are, in the inner perception as a temporal continuum, its limits each time 
delineated.  Also  unlike  Leibniz,  space  and  time  are  not  only  relative;  there  are  general 
representations  of  comparative  relations,  in  which  we will  uncover  by a  more  precise  analysis 
involved absolute determinations: local, temporal are absolute, distance is relative. In determining 
that is distant in the space or in the time is involved the determination of spatiality and temporality 
in general (§ 11). That is determined and that is general are not existing separately but as correlative 
limits, as limit of each other. In order to determine such a complex process, it is necessary to work 
together of intuition, fantasy, concept, because temporal and spatial concept is coinciding with the 
concept of thing determined in all its aspects, of a substance (§12). I agree  with Liliana Albertazzi 
when she says, in her introduction to the Italian translation of Psychology III, Brentano in all his life 
has  always  analysed  again  the  moment-now of  the  intentional  representation  in  its  foundation, 
structure, metaphysical implications. More than talking about a first and a second Brentano, it is 
necessary to talk about a philosopher who progressively investigate his fundamental thesis of the 
intentional reference and the manners in which the psychic act has something as object.  In this 
sense, Brentano’s reism is – according to Albertazzi – a sophisticated metaphysic of propriocetion – 
and – I add – a philosophy of consciousness also, which brings to an end Herbart’s criticism of the 
theory of the faculties of the soul. According to Brentano, at the end of his intellectual course, they 
must  dissolve  in  that  continuous,  complex  stream  of  life  of  the  consciousness,  on  which  has 
reflected to a great extent the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth century.
Above all,  as  «an antidote  against  physicalism and logicism,  which dominated the 20th century 
epistemology, and as such appears to be a good philosophy candidate for cognitive science»  (so, 
the inside cover of the book), Brentano pointed out problems more fruitful than some cognitivistic 
simplifications. 
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